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Two Philosophical Psychologists With its cognitive revolution, professional psychology has vastly Increased an already considerable knowledge of the human mind. Philosophers cannot but take note of this, and this is especially true of the writings of psychologists who turn their attention to philosophical issues — philosophical psychologists. I look briefly at recent books by two of these. It is written in memory of a third, Ken Bowers. Santayana offers a concept of spirit that is entirely impotent; it consists of feelings as feelings, conscious awareness as awareness, with no consideration of the possible sources of these, assumed to rest in the realm of matter. This notion has been criticized, and the critique would be justified if spirit is meant to be part of a solution to the mind/body problem. It is not, and Santayana sees any possible explanation of the emergence of mind as a question about matter. If a solution is forthcoming, it will be given by science. It is of some interest, I believe, that each of the psychologists under consideration deal at length with specific mental phenomena that are impotent and would be treated by Santayana as special cases of spirit. Antonio Damasio gives us a fascinating and original study of the grounds and function of human feelings; written as a popular text, it is nevertheless a serious discussion of philosophical issues fully informed by experimental results.1 He acknowledges the importance of feelings to everything human, and has initiated experimental investigations of these in respect to their sources in the brain. As its title suggests, his book makes Spinoza's treatment of the emotions a central theme, tying it into his ongoing scientific study of human feelings and emotions. In the third and fourth books of the Ethics, Spinoza deals at length with the nature and strength of the emotions, and offers an extended list entitled "Definitions of the Emotions." Damasio is attracted to the part that the body plays in Spinoza's account of these emotions; of particular interest to him is the separation made by Spinoza between bodily emotions and conscious feelings — a distinction that he wants to enforce in order to facilitate his study of the feelings. We tend to speak of emotions and feelings as indistinguishable, but he finds their separation is important to an understanding of each. The human mind, says Spinoza, is the idea of die human body; much of our ignorance of the human mind stems from our ignorance of the body; the mind is capable of perceiving many things in proportion of the body receiving many modifications; joy (sorrow) is associated with an increase (decrease) of bodily perfection. These and many others of Spinoza's propositions mesh nicely with Damasio's account of emotions and feelings and his position on the mind/body problem. He finds experimental evidence for these, and indeed fully endorses "William James's conjecture that when we feel emotions we perceive body states" (D 105).2 1 Antonio Damasio. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Orlando: Harcourt, 2003). To be cited simply as D in small caps. 2 This would make a feeling into a kind of knowledge. According to Santayana's view of perception and knowledge, the essence intuited is unlikely to be the same as the essence of the thing perceived. In order for a perception to count as a genuine instance of knowledge, what is needed is functional success in interactions with matter applying it. This applies to ordinary perception, and no less to the observations and theories of science. With Damasio, this view of perception is carried to an altogether higher level. Even our feelings are, in a sense, instances of
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Transcript | Two Philosophical Psychologists With its cognitive revolution, professional psychology has vastly Increased an already considerable knowledge of the human mind. Philosophers cannot but take note of this, and this is especially true of the writings of psychologists who turn their attention to philosophical issues — philosophical psychologists. I look briefly at recent books by two of these. It is written in memory of a third, Ken Bowers. Santayana offers a concept of spirit that is entirely impotent; it consists of feelings as feelings, conscious awareness as awareness, with no consideration of the possible sources of these, assumed to rest in the realm of matter. This notion has been criticized, and the critique would be justified if spirit is meant to be part of a solution to the mind/body problem. It is not, and Santayana sees any possible explanation of the emergence of mind as a question about matter. If a solution is forthcoming, it will be given by science. It is of some interest, I believe, that each of the psychologists under consideration deal at length with specific mental phenomena that are impotent and would be treated by Santayana as special cases of spirit. Antonio Damasio gives us a fascinating and original study of the grounds and function of human feelings; written as a popular text, it is nevertheless a serious discussion of philosophical issues fully informed by experimental results.1 He acknowledges the importance of feelings to everything human, and has initiated experimental investigations of these in respect to their sources in the brain. As its title suggests, his book makes Spinoza's treatment of the emotions a central theme, tying it into his ongoing scientific study of human feelings and emotions. In the third and fourth books of the Ethics, Spinoza deals at length with the nature and strength of the emotions, and offers an extended list entitled "Definitions of the Emotions." Damasio is attracted to the part that the body plays in Spinoza's account of these emotions; of particular interest to him is the separation made by Spinoza between bodily emotions and conscious feelings — a distinction that he wants to enforce in order to facilitate his study of the feelings. We tend to speak of emotions and feelings as indistinguishable, but he finds their separation is important to an understanding of each. The human mind, says Spinoza, is the idea of die human body; much of our ignorance of the human mind stems from our ignorance of the body; the mind is capable of perceiving many things in proportion of the body receiving many modifications; joy (sorrow) is associated with an increase (decrease) of bodily perfection. These and many others of Spinoza's propositions mesh nicely with Damasio's account of emotions and feelings and his position on the mind/body problem. He finds experimental evidence for these, and indeed fully endorses "William James's conjecture that when we feel emotions we perceive body states" (D 105).2 1 Antonio Damasio. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Orlando: Harcourt, 2003). To be cited simply as D in small caps. 2 This would make a feeling into a kind of knowledge. According to Santayana's view of perception and knowledge, the essence intuited is unlikely to be the same as the essence of the thing perceived. In order for a perception to count as a genuine instance of knowledge, what is needed is functional success in interactions with matter applying it. This applies to ordinary perception, and no less to the observations and theories of science. With Damasio, this view of perception is carried to an altogether higher level. Even our feelings are, in a sense, instances of |
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